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          War and Economy 
Historically, war has been believed to 
be of  benefit to states, economies, and the 
advancement of  humanity. In 1891, S.B. 
Luce contended:
War is one of  the great agencies by 
which human progress is effected. Scourge 
though it be, and much as its practice is 
to be deplored, we must still recognize war 
as the operation of  the economic laws of  
nature for the government of  the human 
family. It stimulates national growth, solves 
otherwise insoluble problems of  domestic 
and political economy, and purges a nation 
of  its humors. (Luce, 1891, 672)
Conventional wisdom holds that once 
all tokens are cast, military expenditures 
and war stimulate state economy. This 
idea in part hails from the World War II 
era, when America emerged from the 
Great Depression as a buttress of  the 
European nations and Russia (Blattman 
& Miguel, 2009). As economists Stiglitz 
and Bilmes (2008) point out, “There 
was a problem of  insufficient demand…
World War II created a demand for tanks 
and armaments; the economy ran at full 
steam; everyone who wanted a job could 
get one-and the war even demanded that 
those who could work two shifts did so” 
(Blattman & Miguel, 2009, 115).
However, there is evidence that war 
has the potential to harm economies as 
well. Poast (2006) describes this apparent 
contradiction as “The Iron Law of  
War” (21). He theorizes that war is only 
economically beneficial to a country under 
certain conditions: 
When that country has slow economic 
growth and low use of  resources prior to 
the war; when there are large and sustained 
government expenditures during the war; 
when the war is not local, is of  moderate 
duration, and is financed responsibly. (21)
This is in line with Stiglitz and Bilmes’ 
claim that insufficient demand prior 
to WWII helped create the economic 
conditions that made the war effort fruitful 
for America. However, the effects on 
the European economy after the World 
Introduction
War has historically been and 
continues to be one of  the costliest 
endeavors for citizens, governments, and 
states. Countless lives are lost in war, and 
civilians make up the majority of  war 
casualties (UNICEF, 1996). In 2011 over 
26 million people were displaced from their 
homes due to war, many of  them children 
(Internal Displacement Monitoring 
Center, 2012). Although current data is 
unavailable, from 1986-1996, at least 2 
million children lost their lives in wars, 
and around 5 million more were maimed 
or permanently disabled (UNICEF, 1996). 
There are direct and indirect impacts 
on the economies of  states aside from the 
loss of  life and the incidence of  disability. 
Among these are military expenditures, 
the loss of  physical capital, destruction of  
infrastructure, the decline of  internal and 
external investment, and the opportunity 
costs associated with war spending that by 
necessity decreases government spending 
in other areas of  the economy, unless 
the war in question is financed entirely 
through taxation and/or borrowing. The 
question of  whether or not these costs 
are associated with a decline in economic 
growth is unresolved in the literature.
This paper addresses two questions: 
How does the cost of  war as measured 
in increased military spending (Milex) 
affect the economies of  nation-states? 
How does this cost affect short- and long-
term economic growth? The theoretical 
prediction is that there will be an initial 
positive association between war and 
economic growth which will eventually 
plateau and shift to a negative relationship. 
When war occurs, there may initially be 
an increase in internal investment and 
production. However, war may also 
create uncertainty within markets and 
eventually discourage investment (Mintz 
& Huang, 1990). Additionally, there may 
be a retraction of  other sectors of  the 
economy in response to the expansion of  
the defense sector, and this might impact 
growth positively or negatively (Marwah & 
Klein, 2005).
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Heckelman, 2001). In the long term in the 
U.S. (at the minimum, five years), lower 
military spending encouraged investment, 
which promoted growth, while higher 
military spending eventually crowded 
out investment, thereby reducing growth 
(Mintz & Huang, 1990). 
An analysis of  the relationship between 
international wars, civil wars and income 
per capita is provided by Sevastianova 
(2009). Correlates of  War (COW) data 
is used to measure war incidence and 
duration in a cross-section of  90 countries 
during the period 1970-2000. One, two, 
and five-year intervals are examined to 
establish the relationship between war and 
growth. Sevastianova finds that war tends 
to reduce income growth on average. Civil 
war has a negative effect in almost all cases, 
while the findings regarding international 
war are more complex-- the negative 
effects of  war are greater in the short run 
(six month and one year intervals) than in 
the long run (five year intervals).
Conversely, in an examination of  114 
countries, Koubi (2005) determines that 
the average rate of  growth in per capita 
real output over the period 1960-89 was 
influenced by both inter-state and civil 
war. Koubi also explains how growth over 
the period 1975-89 was affected by the 
wars that took place in the previous period 
(1960-74). When all types of  war are 
included, this research suggests that there 
is a positive relationship between war and 
long-term growth: the greater the duration 
and severity, the higher the subsequent 
growth, while contemporaneous growth is 
negative.
Analyzing a data set of  158 countries 
from 1960 to 2000, Yamarik, Johnson, 
and Compton (2010) study inter-state wars 
as well as incidents of  “Use of  Force” by 
examining 1,463 conflicts. A fatality weighted 
variable for conflict is constructed as well as 
independent variables that address levels of  
fractionalization, democracy, and rule of  
law, among others. The regression, using the 
dependent variable of  real GDP per capita, 
finds that a one standard deviation increase in 
fatality-weighted conflict results in an average 
reduction in real GDP per capita of  between 
0.09 and 0.14 of  a standard deviation. The 
authors claim that war permanently alters 
the economic potential of  a country.
It is reasonable to conclude that a 
were various and pervasive; fallout shelters 
and the fear of  a nuclear war with Russia 
was an immense part of  American 
existence (Marwick, 1974).     
Internal disturbances within a state 
that might approximate war effects are 
political instability and regime change. 
Alesino, Ozler, Roubini, and Swagel 
(1996), found that in countries and time 
periods with a high degree of  political 
instability, growth is significantly lower 
than otherwise.   
There are both direct and indirect 
costs of  war, as described by Arunatilake, 
Jayasuriya, and Kelegama (2001) in their 
analysis of  the cost of  the civil war in Sri 
Lanka. Direct costs of  war include the 
military costs borne by the government, 
costs of  damage to physical and social 
infrastructure, damage to capital assets 
and land, and the costs of  providing for 
the displaced and disabled. The total direct 
cost of  the war in Sri Lanka from 1987 to 
1996 was calculated at over US$ 6 billion 
or 61.9% of  Sri Lanka’s GDP in 1996. 
Indirect costs included lost income 
due to the loss of  human capital, forgone 
investment and foreign investment, 
and lost income from reduced tourism. 
The research found that government 
military expenditure had a negative and 
significant effect on investment in the long 
run, suggesting that military spending 
decreased government investment. 
However, this reduction seemed to have 
no direct effect on economic growth in Sri 
Lanka (Arunatilake, et.al., 2001).   
Marwah and Klein (2005) sought 
to uncover the “hidden costs” of  
military expenditures through their 
macroeconomic analysis of  the impact 
of  military expenditures on productivity 
for the Southern Cone of  Latin America 
from 1971-1990. The results indicate that 
each country’s productivity and growth 
is impacted negatively by its military 
spending, with the loss of  growth varying 
from 4.8% to 17.3%.
The effects of  military expenditures 
on economies have been examined and 
some findings suggest that although 
defense expenditures do not affect 
growth directly, there is an indirect and 
delayed negative effect of  expenditures on 
growth (Mintz & Huang, 1990; Stroup & 
Wars were negative and differed from the 
American experience (Milward, 1970). 
Economic Growth Theory explains 
that war can be expected to affect 
economies in such ways as depleting 
human capital and physical capital stock, 
increasing or slowing the development of  
technology, strengthening or weakening 
existing institutions, and affecting prices 
by raising the cost of  capital. After a war, 
political and economic uncertainty has 
the potential to increase perceived risk 
and decrease expected returns, leading to 
shorter investment horizons. This in turn 
may reduce investment and raise the cost 
of  capital (Blattman & Miguel, 2009).
There are also social and structural 
changes that are in part or fully a 
consequence of  war. They are beyond the 
scope of  this paper, but deserve mention. 
A primary example is the change in the 
productive capacity and the technological 
landscape of  the United States after World 
Wars I and II. Productive capacity rose 
astonishingly, while there was a boom in 
technological advancement:
Many were completely new industries 
of  great importance for the future.…The 
development of  radio receivers, of  nuclear 
fission, of  radar, of  better tractors, of  the 
jet engine, of  new alloys, of  optical glass, of  
measuring tools, of  synthetic materials, of  
electronic computing and control systems 
and of  a wide range of  therapeutic drugs 
were all due largely to research for military 
purposes. (Milward, 1970, 35) 
 There was also an increase in the 
cooperative efforts within Europe after 
WWII, most particularly between France 
and Germany. Cooperation was not only 
a by-product of  the quest for unity, the 
devastation in Europe after the war was 
so great that the road to quickest recovery 
was through cooperation in industry and 
a free flow of  trade, as well as American 
support (Marwick, 1974).
Additionally, the Second World War 
helped to create the conditions under 
which American and Russian interests 
increasingly clashed. A decimated Europe 
laid the groundwork for the Cold War and a 
focus of  the United States on containment, 
having raised American concerns about 
Russian influence in the region. The effects 
of  the cold war on the lives of  Americans 
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five years prior to the war. The second 
dependent variable is defined as long-term 
change in economic growth, measured via 
the difference between the five year post-
war average rate of  growth and the five 
year pre-war average rate of  growth. Data 
for the dependent variables were obtained 
from the University of  Groenengin’s 
Angus Maddison database of  World Per 
Capita GDP (2003).
The sample size was affected by the 
strict inclusion criteria used to control 
for contiguity, as well as by the missing 
data for the variables of  cost and battle 
deaths. Countries at war that experienced 
a simultaneous war of  a different type 
were excluded, as were countries that 
experienced a war at any time during 
the five-year pre-war period or the five-
year post-war period. This was necessary 
in order to observe the effects of  a single 
war on the economic growth of  a state 
during war and after war, while avoiding 
the distortion caused by the observation of  
multiple wars.
      Results
There are no significant relationships 
observed between the independent 
variables and either short-term economic 
growth or long-term economic growth 
in the OLS multiple regression analysis. 
No linear relationship between the 
response variables and the parameters was 
observed. Because of  this, we needed a 
way to descriptively explain the association 
between the variables. A table 1 displays 
Pearson’s correlation for all wars across the 
entire sample and describes the relationship 
between the response variables and the 
parameters as well as the relationship 
between parameters.
Wars are defined as armed conflict that 
involves military action inside state borders 
between the national government and an 
entity within its borders. There must be 
effective resistance by both sides, and it 
must incur at least 1,000 battle deaths 
during each year of  the war (Sarkees & 
Wayman, 2010, 43).
This cross-sectional Ordinary Least 
Squares multiple regression analysis 
consists of  four independent variables and 
two dependent variables; units of  analysis 
are countries at war. The independent 
variables are: total population of  a state 
prior to the war as a control variable for 
state size, duration of  the war as defined 
in months, cost of  the war as defined 
in military expenditures or Milex, and 
battle deaths. Independent variables 
are necessarily restricted to the most 
meaningful due to the small sample size. 
Data for the total population variable 
was gathered from the Penn World Tables, 
version 7.0 (2006). Data for cost (Milex), 
duration, and battle deaths were drawn 
from the Singer and Small COW project 
dataset version 4.0 (1994).   Number of  
battle deaths are defined by COW as 
deaths of  military personnel only and do 
not include the deaths of  civilians. It is 
exceedingly difficult to locate reliable data 
regarding civilian casualties.  
The cost variable requires some 
elaboration due to its complexity. Cost 
is defined as the direct cost of  the wars 
as reflected in military spending. Milex 
spent during the war period was observed 
and compared to pre-war spending. For 
wars of  one year or less, the second year 
before war began was used as a baseline 
for pre-war spending. For wars two years 
or longer, the four-year pre-war average 
was used, excluding the last year before 
the war began. Cost was derived from 
observed differences in spending. Negative 
cost, or a decrease in spending during a 
period of  war, eliminated a state from the 
cost variable, and those cases were not 
observed in the model.
The first dependent variable is defined 
as short-term change in economic growth. 
This is measured by observing per capita 
GDP growth during the war period, then 
finding the difference between the average 
rate of  growth during the war period and 
the average rate of  growth during the 
variety of  factors influence and mediate 
the effects of  war on economic growth. 
Some ways in which the effects of  war 
might vary include the size of  the state 
economy prior to the war, the type of  war, 
whether or not the war is waged on home 
territory, how the war is financed, and the 
severity and duration of  the war, to name 
a few. Clearly, more research is needed in 
order to determine what variables mediate 
war effects, and how, especially in regard to 
economic effects of  war.       
                                                        
Research Design
This paper examines the effects of  
increased military spending during civil 
and international war on the economies 
of  71 countries from 1956 to 2007 through 
a quantitative analysis of  existing Milex 
data. Observations of  changes in military 
spending before, during, and after war 
are made and compared to changes in the 
dependent variable of  GDP per capita 
growth within nation-state economies. 
Only countries that experienced one type 
of  war during the observation period were 
used in the statistical analysis.
Thirty-nine countries experienced 
inter-state or extra-state war, while 32 
experienced civil war. The average 
duration of  a war in the sample was 36 
months. Inter-state and extra-state wars 
are treated identically for the purpose of  
this paper. This is justified on the basis that 
extra-state wars function very similarly to 
inter-state wars in regard to the state that 
is a system-member, and only system-
member states are examined. 
All definitions of  war are those used by 
J. David Singer and Melvin Small for the 
Correlates of  War (COW) project (Sarkees 
& Wayman, 2010).War is classified by 
COW as sustained combat between or 
among military organizations involving 
substantial casualties of  1,000 deaths. 
Inter-state war is defined as a war wherein 
two members of  the inter-state system 
are engaged in combat. Extra-state war 
is defined as the involvement of  a system-
member state in combat with a political 
entity that is not a recognized member 
of  the system. This may be a state that 
has not yet been recognized, or a non-
state entity. Extra-state wars are fought 
outside the system-member’s own territory 
(Sarkees & Wayman, 2010, 41-42). Civil 
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TABLE 1- War Variables and Economic Growth All War-Pearson’s Correlations
Independent Variable
Population
Duration
Cost
Battle Deaths
No. of  Observations
*denotes significance level of  *p<0.05
Short-Term Growth
.095
.002
.101
-.147
68
Long-Term Growth
-.061
.123
-.008
.059
60
Population
1
-.145
-.062
.076
70
Duration
-.145
1
.295*
.180
68
Cost
-.062
.295*
1
-.146
68
BD
.076
.180
-.146
1
56
TABLE 2- War Variables and Economic Growth Inter-state and Extra-state War-Pearson’s Correlations
Independent Variable
Population
Duration
Cost
Battle Deaths
No. of  Observations
*denotes significance level of  *p<0.05
Short-Term Growth
.000
-.109
-.012
.135
37
Long-Term Growth
-.172
-.103
-.096
.171
29
Population
1
-.170
-.116
.361*
37
Duration
-.170
1
.380*
.196
37
Cost
-.116
.380*
1
-.195
37
BD
.361
-.196
-.195
1
34
We computed the OLS correlations (Pearson’s Tables 1-3) and three significant relationships were observed. Within the first table 
above, cost and duration are significantly although weakly correlated. Table 2 describes the effects of  inter-state and extra-state war, and 
an identical but slightly stronger correlation is observed.
Finally, within the third table that describes civil war effects, there is a moderate correlation observed between the duration of  the 
war and increases in fatalities.
 TABLE 3- War Variables and Economic Growth Civil War-Pearson’s Correlations
Independent Variable
Population
Duration
Cost
Battle Deaths
No. of  Observations
*denotes significance level of  *p<0.05
Short-Term Growth
.233
.106
.146
-.062
31
Long-Term Growth
-.013
-.308
-.074
.167
31
Population
1
-.051
-.115
-.186
31
Duration
-.051
1
.334
.529*
31
Cost
.115
.334
1
.190
31
BD
-.186
-.529*
.190
1
22
Several interesting trends were observed utilizing paired t-tests (See Paired Sample Tests Tables 4-6). In Table 4, an average decrease 
in growth for all countries during all types of  war (short-term growth) of  1.223 percent did not reach significance, but was observed at the 
.08 level. No change in long or short-term growth was observed for countries that waged inter-state and extra-state war (Table 5). GDP 
was observed to decrease significantly during civil war at the .009 level at an average of  3.495 percent (Table 6). However, during the 5 
year postwar period after civil wars, no significant decreases in growth were observed.
21
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within other sectors of  an economy and 
an increase of  the dependency of  an 
economy on the defense sector. 
There was an average decrease in short-
term growth for all states (average growth 
during war). Using a simple t-test, it was 
observed that GDP per capita decreased 
by 1.2%, significant at the .04 level (Table 
4). For all states, when pre-war growth 
was compared to post-war growth, there 
were no significant changes. However, 
when states experiencing civil war were 
examined independently, it was found 
(via t-test) that GDP per capita decreased 
during war-time by 3.5% on average, 
significant at the .009 level (Table 6).
inter- or extra-state war (Cerra & Saxena, 
2008; Sevastianova 2009). Further 
investigation of  long-term increases 
in military spending in lower income 
countries versus higher income countries 
could shed more light on the economic 
impacts of  such spending.
These longer-term increases in Milex 
lend credence to the idea of  the “ratchet 
effect” of  military spending, which 
states that defense spending that rises 
during a war does not appear to return 
to pre-war levels (Diehl & Goertz, 1985). 
This suggests that the incidence of  war 
stabilizes defense spending at a higher 
level, possibly reflecting a tendency for 
the defense sector of  a state to resist 
retraction once it is expanded. This, by 
logical necessity, would mean a retraction 
 For all types of  war, described in Table 
4, there was an increase in Milex that 
predictably occurred during war, but 
that continued to climb in the postwar 
period. This finding was significant at the 
.028 level. The 95% confidence interval 
suggests that the increase is between 2.2% 
and 36.6%. By taking the mean difference 
between the post- and pre-war period and 
dividing it by average pre-war spending, 
it suggests that on average this upward 
trend was 19.4% more than the pre-war 
average. This effect was more pronounced 
with civil wars (.044) than with inter-state 
wars (.057); significance was lost when 
civil wars were removed. 
It is worth noting that countries that 
experience civil war are generally lower 
in income than countries that experience 
TABLE 4- Paired Samples Test-All Wars
Difference Variable
AW Milex-BW Milex
AWGrw-BWGrw
   (long-term growth)
WarGrw-BWGrw
   (short-term growth)
*denotes significance level of  *p<0.05
N
61
60
68
Mean
3134961.37
602
-1.223
Std. Deviation
1.085E731
4.397
5.729
T
2.2561
1.061
-1.76031
Df
60
59
67
Sig. (2-tailed) 
.028*
.293
.083
TABLE 5- Paired Samples Test-Inter-state and Extra-state War
Difference Variable
AW Milex-BW Milex
AWGrw-BWGrw
   (long-term growth)
WarGrw-BWGrw
   (short-term growth)
*denotes significance level of  *p<0.05
N
33
29
37
Mean
4966899.667
1.195
 .680
Std. Deviation
1.443E7
3.451
3.497
T
1.977
1.865
1.183
Df
32
28
36
Sig. (2-tailed) 
.057
.073
.245
TABLE 6- Paired Samples Test-Civil War
Difference Variable
AW Milex-BW Milex
AWGrw-BWGrw
   (long-term growth)
WarGrw-BWGrw
   (short-term growth)
*denotes significance level of  *p<0.05
N
28
31
31
Mean
975891.250
.048
-3.495
Std. Deviation
2442227.405
5.123
6.988
T
2.114
.052
-2.784
Df
27
30
30
Sig. (2-tailed) 
.044*
.959
.009*
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significantly although weakly correlated. In 
regard to inter-state and extra-state war, an 
identical but slightly stronger correlation is 
observed (Table 2). Finally, concerning civil 
war effects, there is a moderate correlation 
observed between the duration of  the war 
and increases in fatalities (Table 3). 
In addition, some interesting 
relationships were observed after the 
computation of  several simple t-tests. 
A significant decrease of  1.2 percent in 
average short-term growth rates (during 
war) occurred over the entire sample 
(Table 4). Military spending increases that 
occur during war may not return to pre-
war levels, signifying a greater reliance on 
the military sector within state economies 
post-war. The average increase in Milex 
post-war was 19%. This effect was more 
significant for civil (.044) than for inter- or 
extra-state wars (.057). 
This analysis is limited by sample size, 
and further research that uses methods that 
continue to control for the contiguity of  
conflicts while allowing for a larger sample 
size with greater depth may yield more 
information about the effects of  war on 
economies. The sample could be enlarged 
by obtaining data on countries at war 
before 1960. In the present model, there 
are no significant relationships observed 
between increases in military expenditures 
during times of  war and negative or 
positive growth in the economies of  states.
This paper examines only the effects 
of  increased government expenditures 
due to war on nation-state economy; there 
are many other avenues by which war can 
affect an economy either negatively or 
positively. Warfare can affect economies 
through massive loss of  life, the destruction 
of  physical infrastructure, increasing or 
slowing the development of  technology, 
strengthening or weakening existing 
institutions, and affecting prices by raising 
the cost of  capital. Additionally, the flow of  
refugees and illicit trade in drugs and arms 
stimulated by war are harmful not only to 
the states of  origin but to the regions the 
states occupy (Blattman & Miguel, 2009). 
 All of  this being said, there are many 
avenues by which an economy can be 
affected other than through the phenomena 
of  war. Economic policies that boost 
production may induce further investment 
in physical capital and in human capital 
through education. Endogenous growth 
theory emphasizes the commitment to 
research and development and its positive 
effects on growth, as well as the many 
channels through which investment can 
influence levels of  productivity and growth 
(Barro & Lee, 1994). 
Many factors have the ability to 
negatively affect growth: low levels of  
physical capital investment or human 
capital investment (education, health care), 
and market distortions due to a variety 
of  causes such as political instability or 
economic and capital market policy (Barro, 
1991; Barro & Lee, 1994; Alesina, et al., 
1996). A country may also experience 
economic decline due to financial crises 
(Cerra & Saxena, 2008) and natural 
disasters (West & Lenze, 1994). 
Conclusion
This paper examines the relationship 
between cost of  war as quantified through 
increases in Milex, battle deaths, duration 
of  war, and the economic growth of  states, 
as well as how that relationship changes over 
time. There were no significant correlations 
observed in the multiple regression analysis 
and no linear relationship was observed. 
After the Pearson’s coefficients were 
computed, three significant relationships 
were observed.
For all types of  war (Table 1) across 
the entire sample, cost and duration are 
23
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